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Abstract. Thirty years have passed since the creation of the Anton Piller order; an interlocutory order that allows a 
plaintiff to demand access to a defendant’s premises so as to search for infringing property and documents where 
there is a real threat that such evidence will be lost if the action was to commence in the normal way.  During the 
passage of this time, the Federal Court of Canada, which has a special jurisdiction over intellectual property 
disputes, has developed an innovative Rolling Anton Piller order that is of particular attraction to holders of 
intellectual property. In July 2006, Canada’s highest appellate court had its first opportunity to rule on an Anton 
Piller order, although not a rolling order.  This paper discusses some unintended consequences that the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada may have on rolling Anton Piller orders.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
It has now been over thirty years since the English Court of Appeal decided Anton Piller K.G. v. Manufacturing 
Processes Ltd. (1976).  In that period, the order that bears the case’s name has been adopted in other 
Commonwealth nations including Canada.1  The order has been formalized in the United Kingdom (Civil 
Procedure Act of 1997), Australia (Federal Court of Australia, Practice Notes), is about to be in New Zealand 
(New Zealand Rules Committee), and, if the suggestions of the Supreme Court of Canada are followed, a formal 
order is likely to be drafted in Canada.   
The development of the Anton Piller order demonstrates both strengths and weakness of common law 
methodology.  Strength is demonstrated in the genesis of the order and the work of one inventive counsel, Hugh 
Laddie, formerly a judge of the English High Court, now a Professor of Law at University College, London, who, 
through historical research of early chancery practice, was able to formulate an order that would later become 
known as a form of ‘civil search warrant’ (Berryman, 1984).  Weakness, at least in Canada, is demonstrated by the 
fact that it has taken over thirty years for an Anton Piller case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada.  Given this 
record, the Supreme Court has used the opportunity afford it in Celanese Canada Ltd. v. Murray Demolition Corp 
(2006) to issue a judicial encyclical on what a model Anton Piller order should contain.    
When introduced, Anton Piller orders could be divided into two categories; cases which were dispositive of 
the issues confronting the applicant, and cases where the preservation of evidence was necessary to prove a further 
substantive cause of action.  The former category, described those cases where the applicant held a proprietary 
interest in the property being seized pursuant to the order.  The main objective was the removal from sale of 
pirated copyright, trademark, or patented material.  While commenced as an interlocutory motion, many of these 
cases did not result in a substantive hearing of the merits.  The applicant received everything they wanted from 
interlocutory proceedings, and few defendants challenged the order; usually because liability was self-evident, or 
they lacked the financial resources to do so.  The applicant would often proceed to obtain a default or summary 
judgment.  In the latter category, the defendant often challenged the interlocutory order after it was served.  The 
applicant did not claim a proprietary interest in the material seized pursuant to the order, but needed the material, 
usually documents, to prove its substantive claim.   The Anton Piller order did not distinguish between these two 
categories, despite serving two different and distinct functions. Common to both types of orders were the fact that 
they could be granted ex parte, and allowed for the attachment of interrogatories. These two attributes 
distinguished the order from the usual civil procedural rules which allow for interim preservation (In Ontario see 
rule 45, Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Court, Federal Court Rules 1998, rule 377) and interim inspection of 
property (In Ontario, see rule 32, Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Court, Federal Court Rules 1998 rule 249). 
The early seventies was, relatively speaking, an age of innocence.  The most common method of pirating 
was the use of banks of video and tape recorders which were seized with the offending copies they reproduced.  
The cult of celebrity was still embryonic, and the value attributed to global design and trade marks was still to 
emerge.  Computerization of businesses was present, although the wide-spread use of personal computers was still 
                                                          
∗ A version of this paper was published in   Kierkegaard, S. (2006) Business Law and Technology Vol. 1 and 
presented in the   2006 IBLT Conference, Denmark. 
1 The first reported decision appears to have been Bardeau Ltd. v. Crown Food Services Equipment Ltd. (1982), 
Berryman, 2000 chap. 5), Australia (Wright, 2003) and New Zealand (Busby v. Thorn E.M.I. Video Programmes 
Ltd. (1984), Blanchard, 2003).   
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to come.  Businesses still relied upon paper documentary files.  Jump thirty years, and we now burn CD’s, DVD’s, 
or download direct from satellite to MP3 players pirated material.  The cult of celebrity is endemic, and brand 
names such as Nike, Tommy Hilfiger, Guess, Starbucks etc, are known and valued in all parts of the globe.  The 
personal computer is now personally wearable, and no company can operate without some level of 
computerization. We speak of a paperless society and a digital universe where entire libraries of records can be 
instantaneously loaded onto a USB flash drive, and unlimited opportunities to consume media prevail. Not 
surprisingly, the Anton Piller order has also found new uses, particularly in its second guise as necessary to 
preserve evidence.  Thus, it has been resorted to in restraint-of-trade clauses, and breach of confidentiality upon 
termination of employment where a fear exists that the defendant has wrongfully removed confidential client lists 
or other documents (Ritter v. Hoag,  2004, and Assante Financial Management Ltd. v. Dixon, 2004); to locate and 
seize assets for subsequent judgment as a supplementary feature of a Mareva injunction (Sociedade Nacioal de 
Combustiveis de Angola U.E.E. v. Lundqvist, 1991); as a supplement to the discovery process (Profekta 
International Inc. v. Mai, 1997); and as an extra-territorial orders where the plaintiff seeks an injunction to gain 
access to the defendant’s premises located in a different jurisdiction to determine the existence of disputed 
property (Cook Industries v. Galliher, 1979, and Altertext Inc. v. Advanced Data Communications Ltd., 1985).  
The raison d’être of the Anton Piller order has been the preservation of evidence rather than the 
confiscation of infringing property, despite the prevalence of cases of the latter type before most courts in Canada.  
Criteria to evaluate the exercise of a court’s discretion to grant an order, and protections incorporated in the terms 
of the order, that seem appropriate and understandable as part of an order to preserve evidence, can appear 
superfluous and at odds with an order that seeks to remove infringing property.  Of the latter type, the Federal 
Court of Canada has developed a unique and very effective order known as a “Rolling Anton Piller Order”.  An 
applicant, alleging in one part of the country that it is facing widespread infringement of its intellectual properties 
by unknown persons, has been successful in gaining an Anton Piller order that can be validly executed throughout 
the land.  Some of these orders have been renewed over successive years and have resulted in having hundreds of 
defendants added to the original pleadings.  The Supreme Court of Canada’s failure to distinguish the two 
constituencies who use Anton Piller orders may have lead it to suggest guidelines for a model order that may 
significantly inhibit further use of  Rolling Anton Piller orders in Canada. 
 
2.   The Supreme Court of Canada 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has jurisdiction to hear all manner of cases on appellate review from all provincial, 
as well as federal appellate courts.  It is thus in the peculiar position to make declaratory orders on private civil law 
matters which are, constitutionally speaking, clearly within the domain of provincial jurisdiction, but which have 
effect in all provincial jurisdictions.  This gives the court a unique role to play in developing common law 
principle.  However, the court does not have complete control of its docket.  It is dependent upon an issue of 
importance justifying the expense, in the eyes of a litigant, to warrant the effort to appeal.  Because Anton Piller 
defendants rarely have the resources to mount an appellate challenge, Canada has had to wait thirty years before an 
Anton Piller order has finally reached its highest court in the case of Celanese Canada Ltd. v. Murray Demolition 
Corp (2006).  Significantly, the effective adversaries in this case were two of the largest law firms in Canada.   
The plaintiff, Celanese Canada Ld., was a company that owned and operated a vinyl acetate factory in 
Edmonton.  As part of its corporate restructuring it decided to demolish and sell the Edmonton plant.  In order to 
prepare the site for sale it contracted with the defendant, Murray Demolition Corp., to undertake the demolition.  
In the course of carrying out that contract, Celanese alleged that Murray Demolition and Canadian Bearings Ltd, 
an affiliate, were secretly copying proprietary and confidential information on the operation of Celanese’s plant.  
Celanese further alleged that this information was being used to construct an unauthorized vinyl acetate facility in 
Iran.   
As part of the litigation, Celanese sought and obtained an Anton Piller order against Canadian Bearings.  
The order made provision for an independent supervising solicitor, as has apparently recently become the norm in 
orders given by Ontario courts.  The order required the defendant to allow the plaintiff access to search for all 
documentary evidence touching the substantive dispute, and for its removal. The actual search was undertaken by 
Eastman, the independent supervising solicitor, and BDO Hayes Smith, an independent accounting firm, together 
with two police officers who were present ostensibly to prevent any breach of the peace.  At various times, 
Eastman was in contact with the plaintiff’s lawyers, Cassels Brock (CB).  Upon service of the order, an executive 
for the defendant, Canadian Bearings, requested the presence of their solicitors, Borden Ladner Gervais (BLG).  
The execution of the order took two days in which over 1400 electronic documents were downloaded by BDO 
Hayes Smith and copied onto CD’s.  These were then placed into plastic envelops and sealed with signatures of 
both Eastman and a member of BLG, and given into the custody of BDO Hayes Smith.  At this stage, BLG had 
not had the opportunity to review all the electronic documents copied to determine whether solicitor-client 
privilege should be claimed.  
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One day following the seizure of evidence, the plaintiff’s lawyers, CB, who were themselves acting as 
agents of Kasowitz, a Houston based American law firm responsible for the carriage of the substantive claim, 
enquired of Eastman the whereabouts of the seized documents including the records that had been copied and 
sealed.  At this point in time, Eastman made an error that would prove to be fatal.  Believing that there was no 
agreement between CB and BLG as to how the sealed material was to be handled, nor finding anything in the 
court order on how to dispose of solicitor-client privilege claims, Eastman instructed BDO Hayes Smith to allow 
complete access to CB to the sealed material. A lawyer for CB would later admit to having seen a few e-mails sent 
between BLG and the defendants, and would write an e-mail confirming that he had reviewed all the electronic 
documents seized from the defendants.  A copy of the sealed material eventually found its way into the hands of 
Kasowitz, where a lawyer was given instructions to classify the electronic documents into one of four categories; 
relevant, irrelevant, proprietary, and hot.  During this classification, the lawyer also noticed that some of the 
documents were either addressed to or from BLG, and he placed these into an additional classification of 
privileged.  
Within a few days, and after CB was ordered by the motions judge to furnish a copy of the electronic 
documents seized, BLG realized that privileged documents had been transferred into the hands of CB and 
Kasowitz.  BLG demanded a return of these documents and to be provided with a list of persons at both firms who 
had access to the privileged material.  CB did not immediately reply to this demand, but later indicated that the 
privileged material had been deleted from both firms computing systems.  In subsequent litigation, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal noted that 18 lawyers, clerks and law students at CB, and 12 lawyers at Kasowikz had access to 
the privileged material over a three week period.  
Based on a violation of solicitor-client privilege, BLG moved to have both CB and Kasowitz disqualified to 
further represent Celanese.  This action was dismissed by the motions court, but allowed before the Divisional 
Court.  On further appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, the action was remitted back to the motions judge, on the 
basis that both lower courts had misapplied the appropriate test for disqualifying counsel.  This judgment was 
itself appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.  Thus, the disputed issue before the Supreme Court was the 
appropriate test to be used when considering a motion to disqualify counsel of record.  In particular, the lower 
courts had taken various approaches as to what the moving party, in this case Canadian Bearings, had to prove 
before an order disqualifying the opposing party’s lawyer would be made.  On this issue, the Supreme Court held 
that the moving party need only prove that the other party’s “lawyer had obtained confidential information 
attributable to a solicitor and client relationship which was relevant to the matter at hand.”(Celanese Canada Ltd. 
v. Murray Demolition Corp. 2006, paragraph 42 of the judgment).  In the context of an Anton Piller order, the fact 
that confidential information was seized pursuant to the order’s execution, infers that it relates to ‘a matter at 
hand’.  Upon proof of these two points, a presumption arises in favour of the moving party to the effect that such 
disclosure of solicitor-client documents will prejudice the moving party’s defence in the substantive claim. The 
moving party is not required to give evidence of actual, or a real risk of prejudice.  Once the moving party 
discharges its evidential requirement, the onus of proof shifts to the opposing party to rebut the presumption of 
prejudice.  That a presumption operates in favour of the moving party is justified on the basis that the opposing 
party is largely author of its own misfortune.  It has been the over zealous execution of the order that has created 
the problem in the first place.  
Binnie J., giving the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, states that the presumption should operate 
because it would be wrong to expect the moving party to have to reveal what confidential information had been 
breached to prove prejudice.  Such an approach is inconsistent with the protection afforded the solicitor-client 
privilege in the first place.  Secondly, placing the onus on the opposing party gives an incentive to avoid over 
zealous execution and to strictly observe the terms of the original order so as to avoid even inadvertently viewing 
privileged material.  Thirdly, it seems intuitively unfair to require the moving party who has been subject to the 
surprise attack of an Anton Piller order, to then be required to carry a further evidential burden to clear up an error 
caused by the careless actions of the opposing party.  
In this case, lawyers from CB and Kasowitz admitted that they had at some time in their possession 
documents over which solicitor-client privilege would arise; nor did they rebutted the presumption by showing 
that what they had seen were merely mundane or insignificant documents.   
The fact that the opposing party’s lawyers had access to privileged material does not necessarily mean that 
they should be disqualified from acting, and a court should go onto consider whether there is some other 
appropriate remedy short of disqualification.  Such a concession is warranted to respect the right of a party to have 
legal representation of its own choice, and, to accommodate the fact that in the course of modern complex 
litigation, involving the exchange of large volumes of documents, mistakes will happen.   The Supreme Court 
accepted the submissions of the Advocates’ Society and the Canadian Bar Association, who were given intervener 
status, as to criteria which should guide a court’s decision whether to disqualify:   
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1. How the documents came into the possession of the plaintiff or its counsel [In this case CB and Kasowitz 
had come into possession of the documents through execution of the Anton Piller order without taking 
sufficient precautions to isolate privileged material.] 
2. What the plaintiff and its counsel did upon recognition that the documents were potentially subject to 
solicitor-client privilege [Crucial was the failure by CB to observe the terms of the Anton Piller order 
which required the preparation of list of the documents seized at the search site, and the subsequent 
breaking of the sealed computer records without notice and attendance by BLG.] 
3. The extent of the review made of the privileged material [CB and Kasowitz were not forthcoming on the 
extent to which they had reviewed the privileged material.  The fact that Kasowitz was able to classify the 
documents into relevant, irrelevant, proprietary, hot and privileged, was inconsistent with their assertion 
on this motion that they had not undertaken a substantive review.] 
4. The contents of the solicitor-client communications and the degree to which they are prejudicial [This 
point was met when CB was unable to rebut the presumption of prejudice.] 
5. The stage of the litigation [The litigation was only at an early stage and BLG had informed CB 
immediately upon knowing of the breach of solicitor-client privilege that they took the matter extremely 
seriously.] 
6. The potential effectiveness of a firewall or other precautionary steps to avoid mischief. [There was 
insufficient evidence of appropriate precautions taken to avoid the mischief.] 
7. After applying these criteria, the Supreme Court reiterated that the opposing lawyers had not met the 
requirements of the test outlined in an earlier decision of the Supreme Court also dealing with 
disqualification of lawyers.  
 
 In MacDonald Estates v.Martin (1990) at page 1260, Sopinka J. had indicated the appropriated test as: 
“…that the public represented by the reasonably informed person would be satisfied that no use of confidential 
information would occur.”  Presumably, the criteria now endorsed by the Supreme Court is to be read as 
elucidating Sopinka J.’s test, and not in opposition to it.  Applying the above criteria, the Supreme Court 
disqualified CB and ordered Celanese not to take advice from Kasowitz with respect to any litigation in Canada.  
Clarification of the evidential requirements associated with a motion to disqualify counsel who have 
infringed upon solicitor-client privilege is obviously important.  This decision of the court reinforces its earlier 
position in MacDonald Estates v. Martin, (1990). However, what is of greater significance in the judgment is the 
opportunity seized by the Supreme Court to outline, in quite extensive detail, ‘guidelines for the preparation and 
execution of an Anton Piller order’.  This comes in spite of an assertion by the court that the decision of the 
original motions judge to grant the order was neither being challenged nor an issue before the court.  Given these 
prefatory remarks, it is unclear what later courts are to make of the guidelines, although they are qualified as 
always being ‘dependent upon the circumstances.’  In addition to the guidelines, there is much cautionary 
language discussing the basic criteria for granting an Anton Piller order which can only be construed as expressing 
a desire to dampen the granting of such orders. 
 
2.1 A Mandatory Independent Supervising Solicitor Requirement 
 
The Supreme Court’s guidelines are extensive; many are obvious and have been mentioned in other lower court 
judgments, a fact acknowledged by the Supreme Court, yet other guidelines will raise as many issues as they 
appear to resolve. The most significant change to current practices is the endorsement by the Supreme Court to the 
use of an independent supervising solicitor.  This requirement is alluded to in both the first guideline as well as 
earlier in the judgment where it is asserted that the protection to be accorded a party subject to an Anton Piller 
order includes, “a vigilant court-appointed supervising solicitor who is independent of the parties.” This would 
appear to mandate in all Anton Piller orders an independent supervising solicitor (ISS). 
The history of the ISS requirement is difficult to discern.  Although its genesis is usually attributed to the 
requirement contained in the UK model search order 2, it can also be traced to a suggestion made by Cillers A.J. in 
the South African Supreme Court that execution of the order should require evidence and property seized to be 
placed into the hands of an impartial court officer or sheriff (Roamer Watch Co. v. African Textile Distributors, 
1980 at 273). A somewhat ironic protection accorded infringing intellectual property wrongdoers given the 
apartheid experience of the time.  The actual path to the UK model search order originates in an article published 
by Dockray and Laddie (1990), which was favourably adopted by Nicholls V.C. in Universal Thermosensors Ltd. 
v. Hibben (1992).  
These references were then adopted by the Staughton Committee in 1992, which was charged with creating 
a new practice direction.  What is most notable in this discourse is the fact that the ISS was suggested as a way to 
overcome inexperienced solicitors, (it is important to recall the division of the English bar between barristers and 
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solicitors, a feature that is not practiced in Canada) who, may, through lack of familiarity, or simply pressure of 
time at execution, overlook or misunderstand import procedural protections accorded the defendant under the 
order. In addition, the ISS had the added advantage of impartiality which was seen as important to overcome the 
appearance of bias that service by the plaintiff’s solicitor alone carried.  The Staughton Committee also made a 
recommendation, which was subsequently adopted in the UK practice direction, that the judge exercise a 
discretion whether to dispense with an ISS, and could do so as long as the reasons for dispensing were included in 
the order.  At no time was any empirical evidence offered to suggest that the ISS was necessary to curb 
widespread abuse of Anton Piller orders, rather, the evidence was anecdotal and the measure prophylactic.  
History has repeated itself in the Supreme Court of Canada.  Appellant’s counsel, BLG, together with 
counsel for the interveners, The Advocates’ Society and the Canadian Bar Association, all submitted to the court 
that an ISS should be part of an Anton Piller order.  Even respondent’s counsel, CB, remained agnostic on this 
issue; simply asserting that such a requirement should not be retroactive to impinge upon the order currently 
before the court.  Again, no actual empirical evidence was offered as to widespread abuse of Anton Piller orders, 
or that the presence of an ISS would address the abuses that were commented upon by the Supreme Court. In the 
course of his judgment for the court, Binnie J. only expressed disquiet over the decision in Adobe Systems Inc. v. 
KLJ Computer Solutions Inc. (1991), which he called a ‘troubling example,’ and in Ridgewood Electric Ltd. v. 
Robbie (2005), which he described as raising an issue of ‘serious abuse.’  In the former case, the problem was a 
failure to make proper inquires concerning the credibility and good standing of the defendant, and the likelihood 
that it would destroy evidence if the action was commenced on notice. In spite of a finding that the plaintiff had 
failed to make sufficient inquires, the trial judge did not dismiss the order, and in fact held that the defendant had 
infringed the plaintiff’s copyright as well as erased certain evidence in violation of the Anton Piller order itself.  In 
Ridgewood (2005) an ISS was part of the order.  The order was again upheld.  Fault lay in the order in that it did 
not properly lay out the conditions appropriate to a search of residential premises.  And in Celanese (2006) itself, 
an ISS was also present.  The fault lay with an inexperienced ISS who did not appreciate the consequences 
surrounding sealing of evidence, and the fact that the order did not prescribe directions with respect to the 
handling of documents where a claim of solicitor-client privilege was being asserted.   
The arguments in favour of an ISS are largely focused upon the idea that as an officer of the court, an ISS 
can act as an impartial witness to ensure that the order is properly executed, i.e. that the plaintiff’s lawyer does not 
exceed its terms; to take into custody disputed material seized; and to provide an independent report of what 
happened at execution to the court at any subsequent review motion.  The Supreme Court is not the first court to 
voice this option (Grenzservice Speditions Ges.m.b.H v. Jans, 1996, per Huddart J., Fila Canada Inc. v. Doe, 
1996, and Nike Canada v. Jane Doe, 1999, per Reed J., Avngaran International Video & Audio Inc. v. Universal 
DVD Inc., 2006 per von Finckenstein J).  Simply insisting upon the appointment of an ISS still leaves a number of 
issues to be resolved.  For instance, the UK model search order requires the ISS to have a certain experience level 
and insists that the ISS give independent undertakings to the court.  What happens when these are not forthcoming 
or are breached is not known.  For example, if it could be shown that the ISS in Celanese (2006) had acted in 
breach of the order, or was negligent in allowing the sealed envelopes to be broken without the presence of 
defendant’s counsel, would there be liability, and, if so, should the original order afford the ISS immunity from 
suit?   
The argument against a mandatory ISS requirement centres on one of cost.  Requiring an ISS is to deliver 
the ‘Rolls Royce’ of procedural protection.  Who can argue against the proposition that two, possibly three, after 
the defendant’s lawyer arrives, is better than one? But the cost of an ISS must be borne by someone.  The UK 
practice allows cost of the ISS to be determined by the Court; however the initial burden falls upon the plaintiff, 
but can be recovered in accordance with the usual cost rules (UK Model Search Order para. 24, Gee, 2004 at 
17.068, and Universal Thermosensors Ltd. v. Hibben, 1992, at 861).  In the context of the dispute in Celanese 
(2006), whose disputants engaged two of the largest law firms in Canada to represent them, the cost of an 
additional ISS is probably not burdensome.  However, in the context of a dispute touching the removal of pirated 
intellectual property or satellite broadcast signals brought against a flea market vendor or small shop owner, the 
cost, if ultimately borne by the defendant, could be appreciable.  If the cost is shifted to the defendant as part of the 
normal cost following cause rules, the defendant is, in effect, being required to pay for additional procedural 
protection which they may well not have requested if approached in advance.  We should think seriously whether 
the cost of the remedy in these cases is justified to eradicate the feared (although not proven) risk of abuse.  
Alternatively, we could simply require the plaintiff to absorb the ISS cost regardless of the outcome of the 
substantive dispute.  In the context of Anton Piller orders aimed at intellectual property and trademark 
infringement, there is a common practice to cumulate the orders of a number of property holders and execute the 
orders simultaneously.  Thus, there is an economy of scale achieved that can disperse the cost of an ISS over a 
number of mostly financially strong plaintiffs.  However, this option has a negative dark side to it.  Because most 
defendants subject to piracy and trademark disputes prefer to settle their claims rather than to defend the Anton 
Piller orders brought against them, any settlement can easily build in the cost of an ISS to the plaintiff, and is not 
normally subject to judicial scrutiny.  Even if we do not allow any cost shifting mechanism to operate, and make 
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the plaintiff fully absorb the cost of the ISS process, these are obviously then passed onto the consuming public 
through an increase in price on the intellectual property holder’s legitimate product. Ultimately, one has to ask 
whether the ISS process is a cost effective way to provide the appearance of protection. 
Another troubling feature about the ISS requirement is that it is premised on the assumption of bias and 
inability to trust the plaintiff’s solicitor, who is also an officer of the court, to properly execute the court’s order.  
But then, wrongly assumes that an ISS is not similarly subject to the same pressures.  It is naïve to believe that a 
cadre of ISS will be established who can exercise the wisdom of Job.  Rather, given the reality that their retainer is 
being paid for by the plaintiff, they will exercise caution to ensure that further work will follow.  Certainly, there is 
no economic incentive to champion the cause of an infringer.  There is an added problem in that an 
unsophisticated defendant may incorrectly believe that an ISS is there to provide legal advice and otherwise 
safeguard his or her interest.   
The presence of an ISS in Celanese (2006) was seen by the Supreme Court as a practical way to deal with 
assertions by the defendant that material taken was subject to solicitor-client privilege.  Solicitor-client privilege is 
a right held by the client alone, and any requirement to lift the privilege must be demonstrably justified (Hubbard, 
Magotiaux, Duncan, 2006, at §11.40).  It would be wrong for a court as part of an Anton Piller order to order the 
seizure of documents subject to solicitor-client privilege or legal privilege. Gee suggests that the UK model order 
is deficient in this respect in that it purports to allow a court to order the production of documents over which 
privilege is claimed and to have them entrusted into the hands of the ISS.  Gee asserts that a court has no power to 
require these documents to be taken into custody by any party, because this would violate the fundamental nature 
of the right the client has concerning privileged correspondence (Gee, 2004, at 17.049).  The use of an ISS is a 
pragmatic response to deal with the lacuna in the law that states that the client has an almost absolute right to 
solicitor-client privilege, but not beyond that, and the practical concerns of how that privilege can be established.  
Placing the evidence into the hands of a third party under seal, and allowing subsequent judicial proceedings to 
determine the veracity of the claim is a practical solution.  It is not the only solution.  The defendant’s legitimate 
claims could also be met by a requirement that the defendant’s lawyer take custody of a copy of the material 
covered in the Anton Piller order and give an undertaking to produce it as required pursuant to a normal discovery 
process or subsequent court order. The problems with solicitor-client privilege should not be over extended.  On 
the other side of Anton Piller orders, the seizure of infringing property, there is not the same risk that execution 
will engage the seizure of documents involving solicitor-client privilege.  The seizure of infringing material 
subject to the order, and the answering of interrogatories concerning the name and location of sources and 
suppliers, does not raise solicitor-client privilege.  The more immediate privilege in these cases concerns the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  The realty in Canada is that the defendant can be compelled to testify.  The 
only doubtful area is whether the defendant will have a subsequent privilege preventing the use of that evidence in 
a later criminal prosecution (Berryman, 2000, at 86). 
An alternate way to address the potential for abuse at execution of an Anton Piller order is to place greater 
reliance upon the role of the plaintiff’s solicitor as officer of the court to keep within the bounds of the order.  This 
requires the courts to become vigilant in the reporting of execution of the order at a subsequent review motion and 
to ensure that the defendant has been afforded an opportunity to challenge the order if so inclined.  Where there are 
proven abuses concerning execution the court has a number of available remedies.  Obviously, as occurred in 
Celanese (2006), is the removal of counsel of record.  This is an extreme and most potent position, but one that has 
been ordered in the past and for lesser abuses (Grenzservice Speditions Ges.m.b.H v. Jans, 1996, and Computer 
Security Products Inc. v. Forbes, 1999). Other options are to order the return of any material seized (Louis Vuitton 
v. Bags O’Fun Inc., 2000).  In at least one case a solicitor has been held in contempt of court for failing to inform 
the defendant about what materials could be seized under the order, although no fine was imposed upon the 
solicitor (VDU Installations Ltd. v. Integrated Computer Systems and Cybernetics Ltd., 1989). The plaintiff or 
counsel can be called upon to pay damages, including punitive damages, pursuant to the undertaking filed at the 
time of granting the order (Columbia Pictures Inc. v. Robinson, 1987, Walt Disney Co. v. John and Jane Doe, 
2001, Village Gate Resorts Ltd. v. Moore, 1999, and Geophysical Service Inc. v. Sable Mary Seismic Inc., 2003).  
Finally, there is always the broad discretion with respect to cost orders that can express judicial concern with over 
zealous execution (M.M. International Business Directories Ltd. v. International Business Index, 2000, Pulse 
Microsystems Ltd. v. SafeSoft Systems Inc, 1996, and Havana House & Tobacco Merchants Ltd. v. Jane Doe, 
2000). 
A final concern with a mandatory ISS requirement is that it has the potential to lull us into a false sense of 
security concerning the potential for abuse with respect to Anton Piller orders.  An ISS requirement addresses 
execution; it does nothing to address the problems concerning initial granting of the order.  If reported decisions 
are a barometer of problems, by far the most common abuse concerning Anton Piller orders is a failure by 
plaintiffs’ counsel to make full and frank disclosure at the initial ex parte hearing, and which clearly is unaffected 
by an ISS requirement.  For example, in a space of approximately three years (2003-06) more Anton Piller cases 
have raised a failure to observe full and frank disclosure requirements than any other alleged abuse in execution of 
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the order.  Thus, of 18 judgments reported across Canada on Anton Piller orders, seven raised full and frank 
disclosure issues while only two raised issues concerning execution.  
 
2.2 The Requirement of a Plaintiff’s Undertaking 
 
A second recommended guideline from the Supreme Court is a plaintiff’s undertaking in damages, “in the event 
the order turns out to be unwarranted or wrongfully executed”.  The first part of such an undertaking is 
uncontroversial.  It is a usual requirement of interlocutory proceedings to require a moving party’s undertaking 
(Ontario see Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure 40.03; and in the Federal Court, see Federal Court Rules 1998, rule 
373(2)).  But the second part does not automatically follow.  A plaintiff may well ask, if it is either his lawyer, or 
the independent supervising solicitor, acting as officers of the court, who act wrongfully, why is he initially on the 
hook for any damages?  The UK model order requires a series of undertakings covering the following: 
 
Plaintiff’s undertakings: 
 
[1] to compensate for loss if granting or execution of order has caused loss, 
[2] to issue a claim form [statement of claim] as soon as practicable, 
[3] to swear an affidavit confirming what was said by the applicant’s solicitor in  
                 Court, 
 [4] to serve the above documents on the defendant, 
[5] to serve on the defendant a copy of the supervising solicitor’s report, 
[6] not to use any information or documents seized for anything other than the civil litigation and to keep  
                 confidential the same, 
[7] to keep in an account held by the plaintiff’s solicitors a bond, 
[8] to insure any property seized and which is held in custody by the defendant’s  
                  Solicitor. 
 
Plaintiff’s Solicitor’s Undertakings: 
 
[1] to answer any questions whether an item seized is covered by the order, 
[2] to return original documents seized once copies are taken, 
[3] to place in the hands of the defendant’s solicitor, once an undertaking has  
                 been received, any goods seized the ownership of which remains in dispute, 
[4] to retain in safekeeping all other material pertaining to the order until further  
                 court order. 
 
Independent supervising solicitor’s undertakings: 
 
[1] to explain the order to the defendant and inform him or her of the right to  
                  counsel 
[2] to write a report of the execution of the order. 
 
Many of these obviously relate to execution of the order and may not cause a pecuniary loss to the 
defendant.  Some of the undertakings are given by the plaintiff’s lawyer and ISS in their own capacity and not on 
behalf of the client.  The undertaking is a promise made to the court and does not create any contractual or other 
legal relationship between the parties, thus, it cannot support either a suit or counterclaim. The undertaking is a 
discretionary matter to be exercised by the court (Sharpe, 2000, at 2.510).  But, if the defendant has not suffered a 
pecuniary loss, what is he or she being compensated for by way of a damage undertaking?  Zuckerman (1994) has 
argued that the undertaking protects injury to the defendant’s substantive rights as well as his or her procedural 
rights.  The wrongful execution of an Anton Piller order, for example, having in excess the number of persons 
conducting the search, or failing to make an accurate list of items seized, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s 
procedural rights in that they violate the procedural protection afforded the defendant by the order and may 
interfere with the exercise of his or her legitimate rights of ownership and possession.  These procedural rights 
may be violated even though the plaintiff is successful on the substantive merits of the case that supported the 
interlocutory order’s grant.   
 
 2.3 The Hours of Search 
 
The Supreme Court has suggested in a guideline respecting the conduct of a search that it should be “commenced 
during normal business hours when counsel for the party about to be search is more likely to be available for 
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consultation”.  Given the abandonment of Lord Day Acts (Sunday closing laws) as unconstitutional, and the 
movement to extend shopping well into weekend hours, it may be a bit of a misnomer to still speak of ‘normal 
business hours.’  However, the link to availability of defendant’s counsel must imply a normal work week being a 
week day and between the hours of 7am to 7pm.  3If this is intended, the ability to use Anton Piller orders in flea 
markets and other transient commercial places that operate on weekends and at night may be frustrated.  This may 
well be one of those guidelines that must yield to the court’s qualification; that they are ‘depending upon the 
circumstances.’ 
 
2.4   The Power of a Responsible Employee to Permit a Search 
 
Another guideline under the heading ‘conduct of the search’ is the requirement that “premises should not be 
searched or items removed except in the presence of the defendant or a person who appears to be a responsible 
employee of the defendant.”  The choice of language – responsible employee – was used by Nicholls V.C. in 
Universal Thermosensors Ltd. v. Hibben, (1992) and found its way into the UK model order.  The language is of 
some significance.  The nature of an Anton Piller order is that it requires the defendant to give his or her consent to 
permit entry to the premises and to conduct a search.  Extending the order to a responsible employee arguably 
requires of that employee the obligation to give consent to entry and search.  An employee would have to have the 
employer’s authority to give consent unless the conferral of authority derives from some other source.  Without 
authority, the employee would be consenting to a trespass.  The United Kingdom solution to this problem has been 
through legislation that specifically empowers the court to ‘direct any person to permit’ entry (Civil Procedure Act 
(UK) 1997 c. 12, s.7(3)), although this language is not without its own problems (Dockray & Thomas, 1987).   
Without a similar provision, Canadian courts are forced to go through some degree of legalistic gymnastics 
to find a similar power.  A source conferring upon the court the power to order someone other than the defendant 
to permit consent to entry can be found in the respective provincial rules relating to interim inspection and 
preservation of property, as well as in some of the intellectual property statutes.  (For example, in Ontario see 
Rules of Civil Procedure 32 and 45 respectively.  See the Federal Copyright Act, 1985, and the Trade-marks Act, 
1985).  Extending the authority to responsible employees to give consent may have other repercussions to the 
defendant’s rights.  The employee may give up documents where the defendant may well have argued solicitor-
client privilege.  The actions of the employee in such circumstances may amount to waiver. An employee who 
answers interrogatories may be manufacturing evidence that can be used against the defendant.  The defendant 
may be giving up his or her right to speak to counsel before commencement of the search.   
 
3.   The Federal Court and Rolling Anton Piller Orders 
 
It is difficult to discern a definite point in time when the rolling Anton Piller order was created in Canada although 
it is uniquely a creation of the Federal Court (Berryman, 2001).  Canada’s Federal Court is a statutory court 
created pursuant to the constitutional powers accorded the Federal government to establish courts for the ‘better 
administration of the laws of Canada’ (Constitution Act 1867, s.101).  Under the constitutional division of powers 
the Federal government has the exclusive responsibility to create and regulate copyright and patents, and pursuant 
to the trade and commerce power, to make provision for trademarks (Constitution Act 1867, s.91 (23) & (22), and 
s.91(2)). These sections cover the registration and infringement of intellectual property but do not cover 
contractual disputes over the ownership of these rights which are within Provincial jurisdiction under s. 92 (13); 
the right to regulate property and civil rights in the Province.  While the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, and the 
reasons for maintaining it as a separate court, have often been challenged throughout its 126 year history, most 
critics have accepted the desire to have a specialist tribunal deal with, among other things, intellectual property as 
a valid reason for the court’s continued existence (Bushnell, 1997).  Pursuant to this specialized nature the Federal 
Court, during the eighties, built up a significant Anton Piller jurisdiction, the majority of which involve breaches 
of copyright and trademark, but now includes pirated satellite broadcast signals (Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership 
v. Rex, 2002).  
The Federal Court has certain procedural advantages to litigants.  One, litigants can expect a certain 
familiarity by the bench to intellectual property law.  The plaintiff can quickly surmount the initial threshold test to 
Anton Piller relief.  Two, the court operates throughout Canada. An order granted in, say Toronto, can be executed 
in any part of the country and made returnable in any registry where the court functions.  Three, for a time, the 
Federal Court did not operate a case management system thus it was possible to have large number of defendant’s 
added to one proceeding, in one case, over 800 defendants.  This was advantageous where the primary reason for 
the order was simply to remove infringing products from the market place so as to protect the ephemeral value of a 
trademark or copyright.  The plaintiff was successful at the interlocutory stage without having to be overly 
                                                          
3  The UK model order suggests that the order should not normally specify a commencement hour before 9.30 
a.m.    
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concerned with bringing the action on for final determination.  The court has since adopted case management, 
limiting the number of defendants added to one proceeding, and has required plaintiffs to bring their actions to 
some conclusion, either trial or default judgment, or withdrawal. Status Review Hearings have had the effect of 
limiting the large number of defendants that use to be added to rolling orders in the past (Drapeau, 2004, at 469).  
Four, an interlocutory Anton Piller order issued by the court is valid for one year from its grant and can be served 
on any defendant during that time.  However, service on a particular defendant then commences a 14 day clock by 
which time the plaintiff must amended its pleadings by adding the defendant’s name, report to the court on the 
execution of the Anton Piller order, and requested a continuance of the interlocutory injunction until trial.  Five, 
the Federal Court, as have all provincial courts, has embraced the standard Ormrod L.J. tests for granting an Anton 
Piller order, but has resisted the need to create a distinct independent supervising solicitor requirement as in the 
United Kingdom. Thus, the Anton Piller order remains a cost effective means to secure the removal of infringing 
intellectual property. 
The majority of Anton Piller orders sought in the Federal Court over infringing intellectual property have 
been brought by a limited number of counsel.  Most prominent have been Lorne Lipkus, Colleen Zimmerman, and 
Christopher Pibus.  These counsels have considerable expertise in obtaining and executing Anton Piller orders and 
maintain their own independent private investigators to supply the necessary affidavit evidence to support the 
orders. The genesis of the rolling order appears to have been a number of Anton Piller orders executed against 
known itinerant street and flea market vendors. These orders were brought by known trademark and copyright 
holders against defendants who had pirated video, CD and software, as well as jewellery, clothing and other 
apparel.  The affidavit evidence offered in support provided specific details of infringement.  After a number of 
site specific Anton Piller orders were granted, these were then used as evidence to support new affidavit evidence 
from private investigators alleging widespread infringement occurring in many flea market locations across 
Canada.  Because the plaintiff could not identify the defendants in advance the appellation John and Jane Doe 
appeared on the style of cause.  By the 1990’s approximately 50 of these rolling orders were operating within the 
country at any one time, and each may have attracted several hundred defendants to the proceeding.  
Individual acts of infringement caught by these rolling Anton Piller orders do not by themselves create 
large damage awards.  To make this process cost effective it is the practice of counsel to ‘batch’ the execution of 
multiple orders obtained over a successive period of time.  Thus, by the time that a raid is made in a flea market, or 
small confectionery store, counsel will be executing a number of orders representing a variety of intellectual 
property holders.  Following execution, counsel will return to court on a review motion to report on the execution.  
At the review, counsel will introduce a report on what was seized.  This report may be by way of CD-ROM 
showing visual evidence of how the material seized does violate the plaintiff’s intellectual properties.  Invariably, 
most defendants choose not to appear, or where they do, counsel will attempt to persuade the defendant to agree to 
a consent judgment.  Where the defendant objected to the plaintiff’s request for permission to enter its premises, 
counsel will move for a show cause hearing for contempt of court.  At a later stage after the review process the 
plaintiff will usually move for default judgment.  Rarely does a trial of the merits take place.  Thus, for a 
defendant, a rolling Anton Piller has a certain life circle to it. The defendant may enter the process months after the 
order was initially granted, be served, reviewed, and have judgment entered against it, all at the same time that the 
order is bringing other new defendants into its ambit. In fact, the order may be subsequently renewed beyond its 
one year duration and thus bring several hundred defendant’s within its terms. 
Largely because few defendants choose to defend Anton Piller orders, there has been little reported judicial 
discussion on rolling Anton Piller orders.  The nature of the order has been summarized by Reed J. in Fila Canada 
Inc. v. Doe (1996) as follows: 
          The order, which is sought, is what is known as a “rolling” Anton Piller order.  As is obvious from 
the style of cause, when these orders are obtained from the Court neither the identity nor the address of the persons 
against whom they will be executed are known.  On some occasions one or two persons may be identified as 
named defendants but they will have no necessary connection to the Jane and John Does against whom the order 
will be executed.  The known defendants are allegedly infringing intellectual property rights belonging to the 
plaintiff but in different places, at different times and in different circumstances.  These “rolling” orders can be 
distinguished from defendant-specific Anton Piller orders.  While defendant-specific Anton Piller orders may also 
include Jane and John Doe defendants, in general, the latter will be connected to the named defendants, for 
example, by being an employee of the defendant or a supplier of the alleged counterfeit goods of the defendant. 
The “rolling” orders are executed against street vendors and transient flea markets vendors although they 
are framed in broad enough terms to encompass the search of retail premises, office premises, vehicles, 
warehouses, as well as residences.  They are usually expressed to last a year subject to being renewed. Pelletier J. 
has commented upon what constitutes appropriate affidavit evidence to justify a nationwide rolling Anton Piller 
order in Club Monaco Inc. v. Woody World Discounts (1999): 
          In general, a number of instances of counterfeiting would be required to justify a “rolling” order for 
the simple reason that a specific instance would only justify a specific order.  If the plaintiff wishes an order 
applicable to unlimited future instances, it is incumbent upon it to demonstrate that specific orders are not an 
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appropriate remedy.  The deponent’s unsupported testimony as to his or her belief that such an order is required 
would not usually be sufficient. 
         In the same way, proof of a number of incidents of counterfeiting in Ontario would only justify an 
order which applied in Ontario.  If a Canada wide order is sought, there should be some proof that the 
counterfeiting is not a local problem.  This is not an insurmountable problem: an order tailored to the evidence 
submitted at the time of the hearing could be extended subsequently by amendment if further evidence of 
counterfeiting in other provinces or regions became available. 
In addition to the above two cases, there is provision that a rolling Anton Piller order should not authorize 
execution against an unnamed person occupying residential premises (Nike Canada Ltd. v. Jane Doe (2), 1999).  It 
is also advisable that before granting a rolling Anton Piller order, that there be at least specific instances against 
one named defendant who may provide some opportunity to scrutinize the validity of the plaintiff’s alleged 
intellectual property rights in a proper adversarial process (Columbia Pictures Industry Ltd. v. John and Jane Doe 
(2000).  
Reconciling the rolling Anton Piller order with the classic Ormrod L.J. criteria for granting the order is 
difficult.  The plaintiff can readily meet the first threshold hurdle, i.e. demonstrate a strong prima facie case, by 
pointing to its registered copyright, trademark or patent and providing specific examples of infringement. The fact 
that the examples are referable to specific defendants rather than the amorphous John and Jane Does has not been 
commented upon. The second criterion, proof that potential or actual damage is very serious for the plaintiff, has 
usually been met by simple assertions that the continued presence of infringing material in the market place 
threatens the trade reputation of the plaintiff, particularly where the goods are of inferior quality, or, threatens the 
goodwill with established licensed retailers of the plaintiff’s goods.  
The third criterion, and one described by the court as the most crucial element in proof (Adobe Systems 
Inc. v. KLJ Computer Solutions Inc, 1999), is more problematic.  That test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate 
with clear and convincing proof that the defendant has in his or her possession incriminating documents or things 
and a real possibility of destruction of such material.  This test would appear to require a known defendant to be 
satisfied.  While the actual identity of the defendant may not be known at the time the order is sought, 
nevertheless, it does contemplate that the plaintiff could point to a specific defendant, or at least the location where 
the defendant is most likely to operate.  For a rolling Anton Piller order, while there may be some known 
defendants when it is first granted, the majority of later defendants could not be said to have been known, or 
within the contemplation of the plaintiff, at the time the order is sought.  This criterion has been met by pointing to 
three recurrent themes: the ease of removal and disposal of the counterfeit items (Cullom Machine Tool & Die Inc. 
v. Bruce Tile Inc., 1990, and Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Coinex Video Games Inc., 1983); the general transient 
nature of the potential defendant’s business i.e. judicial notice of the activities of street vendors, flea market 
operators, and concert merchandisers (Adobe Systems Inc. v. KLJ Computer Solutions Inc,1999, but see Top Star 
Distribution Group Inc. v. Sigm, 2000); and the prior experiences of the plaintiff; i.e. a track record of successful 
site specific Anton Piller orders will justify the need for a rolling Anton Piller order (Titan Sports Inc. v. Mansion 
House (Toronto) Ltd., 1990, and Nike Canada Ltd. v. Jane Doe (2), 1999, but see Chin-Chin Communications 
Corporation v. Chinese Video Centre Ltd.,1983). 
Ormord L.J.’s criteria are formulated to primarily preserve evidence where there is a real fear of destruction 
if notice is given.  As such, they contemplate a cause of action in which the Anton Piller is an ancillary order to 
ensure the plaintiff is not thwarted in its action purely through the loss of evidence at the hands of the defendant. 
Of course, the order has always been used for other purposes, namely to seize and remove from sale infringing 
property.  In these cases the plaintiff has no intention of bringing the proceeding on for a full trial of the merits; 
nevertheless, the fiction over preservation of evidence is maintained.  Where the primary rationale for the order is 
the removal of infringing material from sale, the adaptation of Ormrod L.J’s criteria makes perfect sense, although 
it can hardly be said to be consistent with the criteria.  The rolling Anton Piller order merely takes that adaptation 
to its furthest point.  The Federal Court in Canada has, in affect, created a wide-sweeping pre-judgment seizure 
order.   
If the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Celanese (2006) now mandates a mandatory independent 
serving solicitor the economics of rolling Anton Piller orders will change appreciably.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the majority of defendants do not contest Anton Piller orders and that plaintiffs simply move forward 
to enter default judgments.  Either defendants accept their guilt over retailing infringing material, or the cost of 
defending (litigation fees or time away from the defendant’s business absorbed in attending court) is simply too 
high.  If the latter is true in the face of clear evidence of overreaching by plaintiffs then an independent solicitor 
requirement may be justified.  Again, from anecdotal evidence, the former is true.  Itinerant vendors who infringe 
are by and large conscious that they are engaged in illicit dealing.  The absence of merchandise records, the speed 
with which communication takes place between vendors when Anton Piller raids take place, and the often covert 
way illicit goods are supplied to vendors all suggests a level of sophistication and duplicity in their activities.  This 
is not to minimize the potential and likelihood that some plaintiff’s do exceed the boundaries of the Anton Piller 
order; however, as discussed above, there are other means of handling these breaches before imposing the burden 
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of an independent solicitor requirement.  For instance, the court can impose cost penalties on plaintiff’s solicitors 
for excessive service, can restore to the defendant all property taken, and can impose solicitor-client costs and 
penalty damages pursuant to the plaintiff’s damage undertaking (Havana House & Tobacco Merchants Ltd. v. Jane 
Doe, 2000).   
The Federal Court’s rolling order has not addressed the issue of the plaintiff’s lawyer’s personal 
undertaking and how, or who should bear the primary responsibility where it is infringed.  The standard 
undertaking required by the court mirrors the language suggested by the Supreme Court in its guidelines rather 
than the more detailed requirements specified in the UK model search order.  The hours for service of the rolling 
order are set as between 7am and 9pm on any day of the week, which clearly accommodates the more transient 
nature of those engaged in pirating and infringing conduct.   
With respect to the issue of who is bound to observe an Anton Piller, the usual Federal Court order is 
worded; “each defendant or person in charge of a defendant’s premises shall permit”.  The language does not have 
the same evaluative criteria as ‘responsible employee’.  It is intended to be more encompassing reflecting the fact 
that operators of small stores, flea markets, and other transient retail outlets my well leave other persons in charge, 
often family members or business associates, without that person necessarily coming within the usual legal status 
of being an employee.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada took the only opportunity it has had in 30 years to express important principles on 
the working of Anton Piller orders in Canada.  The facts in Celanese (2006) put before the Court the category of 
cases where one of the litigants fears the destruction of documentary evidence, and where the proceedings are 
likely to be litigated.  The guidelines suggested by the court may be appropriate in these circumstances, although 
even in these cases the requirement of an ISS may miss the mark.  For cases arising in the other category of Anton 
Piller orders, namely the seizure of infringing intellectual property, the guidelines, and the cautionary language 
used by the Supreme Court to describe the Anton Piller order, suggests that the Federal Court may well have to 
review its Rolling Anton Piller order practices. 
It is easy to be critical of the Federal Court’s rolling order.  It is a type of pre-judgment seizure and has the effect 
of violating a cardinal common law principle that judgment cannot be obtained before trial, and that a person has a 
right to be heard before judgment (Sharpe, 2000, at §2.750, and Berryman, 2002).  One comes to expect that the 
highest level of scrutiny and procedural protections would be applied to an order that has been described as the 
nuclear weapon of civil procedure (Bank Mellat v. Nikpour, 1985, at 92 per Donaldson LJ.).  But the order is very 
much a product of its time as a reasoned response to the pervasiveness of intellectual property infringement.  
Canadians share an ambivalent attitude to piracy.  They regard it as a victimless crime, similar in criminal 
proportionality to highway traffic offences.  Rationally, they can understand the economic arguments that make 
piracy a crime, but emotionally, they are also willing accomplices in fuelling a market for illicit goods.  Canadians 
would be concerned if excessive public law enforcement resources were shifted from the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes of violence to support the interests of what are perceived as well financed intellectual 
property holders.  Measured in this context the Federal Court’s activities are an accurate read of the public’s 
tolerance for law enforcement in this area.  Intellectual property holders are in a de facto sense given the means to 
privately pursue the prosecution of those who commercially exploit piracy.  With respect to damages for 
intellectual property infringement routinely caught under a Rolling Anton Piller order, the Federal court has 
created a tariff in which a plaintiff will be entitled to $6,000 against a defendant who is guilty of infringing 
behaviour on fixed retail premises; $3,000 against a defendant operating from a transient street stall or push car; 
and $24,000 against a manufacturer and distributor of infringing material (Oakley Inc. v. Jane Doe, 2000).  This 
tariff approach has been introduced to avoid the costly process of sending damage assessment for a reference.  The 
damages have been called ‘conventional’ and ‘nominal’.   Nominal damages must still be linked to the reasonable 
compensatory losses experienced by the plaintiff.  The practice adopted by the Federal Court does not appear to 
follow this practice.  There is an obvious parallel to statutory damages that have been introduced for copyright 
infringement in Canada.  The rolling Anton Piller order completes the picture by accommodating a form of private 
civil search warrant.  Where execution of this order has abutted other cherished common law values, and in 
particular the view that an ‘Englishman’s home is his castle’, a principle derived from the celebrated case of 
Entick v. Carrington (1765), the Federal Court has been quick to withhold the rolling Anton Piller from operation 
and have insisted upon a site specific order where the demonstrably need for executing the order at a place of 
residence is more closely scrutinized (Nike Canada Ltd. v. Jane Doe, (2)).   Nor should we ignore the fact that a 
rolling Anton Piller defendant is not going to face imprisonment as a consequence of what is discovered pursuant 
to the order or even if he or she disobeys the order.  Although there is power to imprison for contempt of court 
rarely will it be exercised in an Anton Piller setting, and only after continuous refusal to abide by the court’s order 
(Lyons Partnership LP v. MacGregor, 2000, and Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Bags O’Fun Inc., 2003).  In fact, 
the standard requirement that the plaintiff return to the court on a review motion to report on execution, add the 
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defendant to the action and ask for a continuation of the injunction, mean that the conduct of the Anton Piller order 
will receive far greater scrutiny than that which follows the grant and execution of a criminal search warrant by the 
police.      
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